

# Advanced Microeconomic Analysis, Lecture 1

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# Welcome to Advanced Microeconomic Analysis

- ▶ This course is an introduction to the foundations of microeconomic theory, that is, the analysis of the behavior of individual rational agents (consumers, firms, etc).
- ▶ The course will be taught entirely in English.
- ▶ Website: <http://rncarpio.com/teaching/AdvMicro>
- ▶ Announcements, slides, & homeworks will be posted on website

# About Me: Ronaldo Carpio

- ▶ BS Electrical Engineering & CS, UC Berkeley
- ▶ Master's in Public Policy, UC Berkeley
- ▶ PhD Economics, UC Davis
- ▶ Joined School of Banking & Finance in 2012

- ▶ Main textbook: *Advanced Microeconomic Theory, 3rd Ed* (2003) by Jehle & Reny
- ▶ We will tentatively cover Chapters 1-5 and 7-8. Material may be added or dropped, depending on time constraints.
- ▶ For those interested, a more mathematically rigorous textbook is *Microeconomic Theory* by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green.

- ▶ There will be around 5 graded homework assignments, due every 2 weeks. Assignments will be posted on the course website.
- ▶ Homeworks: 15%
- ▶ Midterm exam: 35%
- ▶ Final exam: 50%

# Contacting Me

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# Course Outline

- ▶ Preliminaries: Convexity and Constrained Optimization (Appendix A2.2 & A2.3)
- ▶ Consumer Theory (Chapter 1)
- ▶ Duality (Chapter 2.1)
- ▶ Risk and Uncertainty (Chapter 2.4)
- ▶ Theory of the Firm (Chapter 3)
- ▶ Partial Equilibrium (Chapter 4.1)
- ▶ General Equilibrium (Chapter 5.1, 5.2, 5.4)
- ▶ Game Theory (Chapter 7)
- ▶ Imperfect Competition (Chapter 4.2)
- ▶ Asymmetric Information (Chapter 8)

- ▶ Let's begin by considering sets of points in  $\mathbb{R}^n$ .
- ▶ A set  $S \subset \mathbb{R}^n$  is *convex* if: for any two points  $\mathbf{x}^1, \mathbf{x}^2 \in S$ , all points on the line segment joining  $\mathbf{x}^1$  and  $\mathbf{x}^2$  are also in  $S$ :

$$t\mathbf{x}^1 + (1-t)\mathbf{x}^2 \in S \quad \text{for all } t \in [0, 1]$$

- ▶ The weighted average  $t\mathbf{x}^1 + (1-t)\mathbf{x}^2$ , where the weights are positive and add up to 1, is called a *convex combination*.
- ▶ We can also have convex combinations of any number of points:  $t_1\mathbf{x}^1 + t_2\mathbf{x}^2 + \dots + t_l\mathbf{x}^l$ , where  $\sum_i t_i = 1$  and  $t_i \geq 0$  for all  $i$ .
- ▶ An *extreme point* of  $S$  is a point that cannot be written as a convex combination of other points in  $S$ .






Figure A1.4. Some convex combinations in  $\mathbb{R}^2$ .




Figure A1.5. Convex and non-convex sets in  $\mathbb{R}^2$ .

# Properties of Convex Sets

- ▶ If  $S$  is convex, then the convex combination of any finite number of points in  $S$  is also in  $S$ .
- ▶ The intersection of any number of convex sets is convex.

# Hyperplanes

- ▶ A *hyperplane* is a generalization of a line in 2D to  $N$  dimensions:

$$\{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{x} = b\}$$

- ▶ Here,  $\mathbf{a}$  is a *normal vector* to the hyperplane: it is perpendicular to any vector that lies in the hyperplane.
- ▶ For example, in 2D, the equation  $ax + by = c$  defines a hyperplane, and  $(a, b)$  is a normal vector to this hyperplane.
- ▶ An equivalent equation defining a hyperplane with normal vector  $\mathbf{a}$ , passing through a point  $\mathbf{x}^0$  is:  $\mathbf{a} \cdot (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{x}^0) = 0$ .
- ▶ A hyperplane defines two *half-spaces*:
  - ▶ the half-space *above* the hyperplane,  $\{\mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{x} \geq b\}$
  - ▶ the half-space *below* the hyperplane,  $\{\mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{x} \leq b\}$
- ▶ In economics, the most common hyperplane is the *budget line*: if there are  $n$  goods with prices  $p_1 \dots p_n$  and wealth  $w$ , then the equation  $p_1 x_1 + \dots p_n x_n = w$  defines a hyperplane.

# Half-Spaces

- ▶ A half-space is a convex set.
- ▶ Therefore, the (non-empty) intersection of any number of half-spaces is also a convex set.
- ▶ In the standard consumer problem with two goods, the feasible set (that is, the set of possible bundles we want to maximize over) is the intersection of three half-spaces:

$$x_1 \geq 0, \quad x_2 \geq 0, \quad p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 \leq w$$

- ▶ A polygon with  $n$  faces is the intersection of  $n$  half-spaces.

# Separating Hyperplane

- ▶ Suppose  $X$  and  $Y$  are closed, nonempty, and disjoint convex subsets of  $\mathbb{R}^n$ . If either  $X$  or  $Y$  are compact (i.e. closed and bounded), then there exists a hyperplane that *separates*  $X$  and  $Y$ .
- ▶ That is, there exists a nonzero vector  $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{R}^n$  and scalar  $b$  such that:
  - ▶  $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{x} > b$  for all  $x \in X$
  - ▶  $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{y} < b$  for all  $y \in Y$
- ▶ This theorem is be used to prove the existence of general equilibrium and existence of solutions in game theory.




Figure A2.14. Separating convex sets.

# Convex and Concave Functions

- ▶ Consider a function  $f : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ , where  $X$  is a convex set.
- ▶ Let  $\mathbf{x}^1, \mathbf{x}^2$  be any two points in  $X$ , and let  $\mathbf{x}^t$  denote their convex combination:  $\mathbf{x}^t = t\mathbf{x}^1 + (1 - t)\mathbf{x}^2$ , for  $t \in [0, 1]$ .
- ▶  $f$  is *concave* if  $f(\mathbf{x}^t) \geq tf(\mathbf{x}^1) + (1 - t)f(\mathbf{x}^2)$ , for all  $t \in [0, 1]$ .
- ▶  $f$  is *strictly concave* if the inequality is strict.
- ▶  $f$  is *convex* if  $f(\mathbf{x}^t) \leq tf(\mathbf{x}^1) + (1 - t)f(\mathbf{x}^2)$ , for all  $t \in [0, 1]$ .
- ▶  $f$  is *strictly convex* if the inequality is strict.

# Epigraphs and Hypographs of a Function

- ▶ The *epigraph* of a function  $f$  is the set of all points that are *above* the graph:


$$\{(\mathbf{x}, r) \in \mathbb{R}^{n+1} \mid r \geq f(\mathbf{x})\}$$

- ▶ Similarly, the *hypograph* of a function  $f$  is the set of all points that are *below* the graph:

$$\{(\mathbf{x}, r) \in \mathbb{R}^{n+1} \mid r \leq f(\mathbf{x})\}$$



# Epigraph



# Convex and Concave Functions

- ▶ A function  $f$  is concave iff its hypograph (the set of points *below* the graph) is convex.
- ▶ A function  $f$  is convex iff its epigraph (the set of points *above* the graph) is convex.


# Calculus Conditions for Convexity and Concavity

- ▶ A twice-differentiable function  $f$  is concave iff its Hessian matrix (i.e. the matrix of second derivatives) is negative semidefinite at all points of its domain.
- ▶  $f$  is strictly concave if its Hessian is negative definite at all points on its domain.
- ▶  $f$  is (strictly) convex if its Hessian is (positive definite) positive semidefinite at all points on its domain.

# Quasiconvex and Quasiconcave Functions

- ▶ The upper level set of a function  $f$  at a value  $r$  is the set  $\{\mathbf{x} \in X | f(\mathbf{x}) \geq r\}$ .
- ▶ Similarly, the lower level set is  $\{\mathbf{x} \in X | f(\mathbf{x}) \leq r\}$ .
- ▶ A function  $f$  is *quasiconcave* if its upper level sets are convex for every  $r \in \mathbb{R}$ .
- ▶ Similarly,  $f$  is *quasiconvex* if its lower level sets are convex for every  $r \in \mathbb{R}$ .
- ▶ Suppose that  $f : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is quasiconcave and  $X$  is convex. The the set of maximizers of  $f$  over  $X$  is convex.

# A Quasiconcave Function



- ▶ For example, a "bell curve" or normal distribution is not concave, but it is quasiconcave.
- ▶ For any value of  $p$ , the upper level set (that is, the set of all  $x$  such that  $f(x) \geq p$ ) is a convex set.

# Unconstrained Optimization

- ▶ Suppose  $f : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is twice continuously differentiable.
- ▶ Necessary conditions for  $f(\mathbf{x})$  to be a local maximum are:
  - ▶ First-order:  $\nabla f(\mathbf{x}) = 0$
  - ▶ Second-order: The Hessian of  $f$  at  $\mathbf{x}$  is negative semidefinite.
- ▶ If  $f$  is concave, then all local maxima are also global.
- ▶ This is the reason why concavity is so desirable for optimization problems: to find the *global* maximum, you only need to check *local* information about the function.
- ▶ Otherwise, to guarantee a *global* maximum, you might have to compare *all* local maxima.
- ▶ If  $f$  is strictly concave, then there is a unique maximum.

# Constrained Optimization

- Suppose we want to solve a maximization problem with a single *equality* constraint:

$$\max_{x_1, x_2} f(x_1, x_2) \quad \text{subject to } g(x_1, x_2) = 0$$

- For example, the standard consumer problem with 2 goods is

$$\max_{x_1, x_2} u(x_1, x_2) \quad \text{subject to } p_1 x_1 + p_2 x_2 - w = 0$$

- Lagrange's method is to form a new function, the Lagrangian, with an additional variable  $\lambda$ :

$$L(x_1, x_2, \lambda) = f(x_1, x_2) - \lambda g(x_1, x_2)$$

- Then, we find an inflection point of this function, by setting its gradient to 0.

$$\nabla L = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial L}{\partial x_1} \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial x_2} \\ \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial f(x_1, x_2)}{\partial x_1} - \lambda \frac{\partial g(x_1, x_2)}{\partial x_1} \\ \frac{\partial f(x_1, x_2)}{\partial x_2} - \lambda \frac{\partial g(x_1, x_2)}{\partial x_2} \\ g(x_1, x_2) \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

## Example: Find the Closest Point on a Line

- ▶ Suppose we are given a point  $(x_0, y_0)$  and a line  $a_1x + a_2y = b$ .
- ▶ The (squared) Euclidean distance between two points  $(x_1, y_1)$  and  $(x_2, y_2)$  is  $(x_2 - x_1)^2 + (y_2 - y_1)^2$ .
- ▶ We want to find the point on the line that is closest to  $(x_0, y_0)$ .
- ▶ We can write this as a constrained maximization problem:

$$\max_{x,y} -(x - x_0)^2 - (y - y_0)^2 \quad \text{s.t. } a_1x + a_2y - b = 0$$

- ▶ The (concave) objective function is  $f(x, y) = -(x - x_0)^2 - (y - y_0)^2$ .
- ▶ There is one equality constraint:  $g(x, y) = a_1x + a_2y - b = 0$
- ▶ The Lagrangian is:

$$L(x, y, \lambda) = -(x - x_0)^2 - (y - y_0)^2 - \lambda(a_1x + a_2y - b)$$



$$L(x, y, \lambda) = -(x - x_0)^2 - (y - y_0)^2 - \lambda(a_1x + a_2y - b)$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial x} = -2(x - x_0) - \lambda a_1 = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial y} = -2(y - y_0) - \lambda a_2 = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} = a_1x + a_2y - b = 0$$

Divide eqn 1 by eqn 2 to eliminate  $\lambda$ :

$$\frac{x - x_0}{y - y_0} = \frac{a_1}{a_2} \Rightarrow a_2(x - x_0) = a_1(y - y_0)$$

Now we have 2 unknowns and 2 equations. Solve to get:

$$x = \frac{a_1 b + a_2^2 x_0 + a_1 a_2 y_0}{a_1^2 + a_2^2}, y = \frac{a_2 b - a_1 a_2 x_0 + a_1^2 y_0}{a_1^2 + a_2^2}$$

# Lagrange's Theorem (A2.16)

**Lagrange's Theorem** for multiple equality constraints:

- ▶ Let  $f(\mathbf{x}), g^1(\mathbf{x}), \dots, g^m(\mathbf{x})$  be continuously differentiable functions over some domain  $D$ .
- ▶ Let  $\mathbf{x}^*$  be an interior point of  $D$ , and suppose that  $\mathbf{x}^*$  is an optimum of  $f(\cdot)$  subject to the constraints  $g^1(\mathbf{x}^*) = 0, \dots, g^m(\mathbf{x}^*) = 0$ .
- ▶ If the gradient vectors  $\nabla g^1(\mathbf{x}^*), \dots, \nabla g^m(\mathbf{x}^*)$  are linearly independent, then there exist  $m$  unique numbers  $\lambda_1^*, \dots, \lambda_m^*$  such that:

$$\frac{\partial L(\mathbf{x}^*, \boldsymbol{\lambda}^*)}{\partial x_i} = \frac{\partial f(\mathbf{x}^*)}{\partial x_i} - \sum_{j=1}^m \lambda_j^* \frac{\partial g^j(\mathbf{x}^*)}{\partial x_i} \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, n$$

- ▶ Alternatively:

$$\nabla f(\mathbf{x}^*) = \sum_{j=1}^m \lambda_j^* \nabla g^j(\mathbf{x}^*), \quad g^j(\mathbf{x}^*) = 0 \text{ for } j = 1, \dots, m$$

# Lagrange's Theorem (A2.16)

- ▶ Note that these conditions are *necessary*, but not *sufficient*.
- ▶ If an optimum exists, then  $\lambda_1^*, \dots, \lambda_m^*$  exist, but not vice versa.
- ▶ This does not guarantee that the optimum exists (for example, if there is no point that satisfies all the equality constraints simultaneously).
- ▶ Only first-order conditions are used, which means that if there is an optimum, it may be a minimum or a maximum.
- ▶ Second-order conditions (e.g. the Hessian) are necessary to prove whether it is a minimum or a maximum.
- ▶ In this course, we will only deal with concave or quasiconcave functions, so it will be a maximum.


# Why does the Lagrange method work?

- ▶ Recall that the gradient of a function is the direction of *steepest increase*.
- ▶ Suppose we have a smooth function  $f$ , with gradient  $\nabla f(\mathbf{x})$ .
- ▶ At point  $\mathbf{x}$ , if we move at a direction not perpendicular to  $\nabla f(\mathbf{x})$ , the value of  $f$  changes.
- ▶ If we move in a direction perpendicular to  $\nabla f(\mathbf{x})$ , the value of  $f$  is constant.
- ▶ Suppose  $\mathbf{x}$  satisfies the constraint  $g(\mathbf{x}) = 0$ . If we are at a constrained maximum, it is not possible to move along the constraint while increasing  $f$ .
- ▶ This is only possible if  $\nabla f(\mathbf{x})$  is perpendicular to  $g$ , i.e. if  $\nabla f(\mathbf{x})$  is parallel to  $\nabla g(\mathbf{x})$ .
- ▶ This is an alternative way of writing the Lagrangian:


$$\nabla f(\mathbf{x}) = \lambda \nabla g(\mathbf{x}), \quad g(\mathbf{x}) = 0$$

# Inequality Constraints


- ▶ Suppose we want to have *inequality* constraints as well as *equality* constraints.
- ▶ A simple example: suppose we want to maximize  $f(x)$  subject to  $x \geq 0$ .
- ▶ Assume  $f(\cdot)$  is concave.
- ▶ There are three possible ways in which the constraint is satisfied at the optimum.



(a) Case 1




(b) Case 2




(c) Case 3


- ▶ Case 1: the global maximum is at  $x^1 < 0$ , which violates the constraint  $x \geq 0$ .
- ▶ Therefore, the constrained maximum must occur exactly at  $x^* = 0$ , since  $f(\cdot)$  is decreasing at this point.
- ▶ We say that the constraint is "binding" or "active" at the optimum.
- ▶ If we removed this constraint, the optimizer would change.



(a) Case 1




(b) Case 2




(c) Case 3


- ▶ Case 2: the global maximum is at  $x^* = 0$ , which satisfies the constraint  $x \geq 0$  with equality.
- ▶ We say that the constraint is "binding" or "active", but *irrelevant*.
- ▶ If we removed this constraint, the optimizer would not change.
- ▶ The unconstrained FOC conditions are satisfied:  $f'(x) = 0$ .



(a) Case 1



(b) Case 2



(c) Case 3

- ▶ Case 3: the global maximum is at  $x^* > 0$ , which satisfies the constraint  $x \geq 0$  with *strict inequality*.
- ▶ We say that the constraint is "not binding" or "not active".
- ▶ If we removed this constraint, the optimizer would not change.
- ▶ The unconstrained FOC conditions are satisfied:  $f'(x) = 0$ .



- ▶ We can apply the method of Lagrange multipliers to inequality constraints, with some additional conditions.
- ▶ As before, each constraint has its own Lagrange multiplier  $\lambda_i$ .
- ▶ If a constraint is not binding, or binding and irrelevant, then  $\lambda_i = 0$ .
- ▶ If a constraint is binding and not irrelevant, then  $\lambda_i > 0$ .
- ▶ This leads to a more general version of Lagrange's theorem, called the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker or KKT conditions.

▶ **KKT Necessary Conditions for Optimality (A2.20)**

- ▶ Consider the maximization problem with  $m$  inequality constraints:

$$\max_{\mathbf{x}} f(\mathbf{x}) \quad \text{s.t. } g^1(\mathbf{x}) \leq 0, \dots, g^m(\mathbf{x}) \leq 0$$

- ▶ Assume  $f(\cdot), g^1(\cdot), \dots, g^m(\cdot)$  are continuously differentiable.
- ▶ Suppose that  $\mathbf{x}^*$  is a solution to this problem (i.e.  $\mathbf{x}^*$  is a maximizer subject to the constraints).
- ▶ If the gradient vectors of the *binding* constraints at  $\mathbf{x}^*$  are linearly independent, then:
- ▶ There is a unique  $\boldsymbol{\lambda}^* = (\lambda_1^*, \dots, \lambda_m^*)$  such that

$$\frac{\partial L(\mathbf{x}^*, \boldsymbol{\lambda}^*)}{\partial x_i} = \frac{\partial f(\mathbf{x}^*)}{\partial x_i} - \sum_{j=1}^m \lambda_j^* \frac{\partial g^j(\mathbf{x}^*)}{\partial x_i} = 0 \quad \text{for } i = 1, \dots, n$$

$$\lambda_j^* \geq 0, \quad g^j(\mathbf{x}^*) \leq 0, \quad \lambda_j^* g^j(\mathbf{x}^*) = 0, \quad \text{for } j = 1, \dots, m$$

$$\frac{\partial L(\mathbf{x}^*, \boldsymbol{\lambda}^*)}{\partial x_1} = \frac{\partial f(\mathbf{x}^*)}{\partial x_i} - \sum_{j=1}^m \lambda_j^* \frac{\partial g^j(\mathbf{x}^*)}{\partial x_i} = 0 \text{ for } i = 1, \dots, n$$

$$\lambda_j^* \geq 0, \quad g^j(\mathbf{x}^*) \leq 0, \quad \lambda_j^* g^j(\mathbf{x}^*) = 0, \quad \text{for } j = 1, \dots, m$$

- ▶ Let's understand what these conditions mean.
- ▶ Suppose that constraint  $j$  is not binding, or binding and irrelevant (i.e. the optimizer would not change if we removed this constraint).
- ▶ Then its associated Lagrange multiplier,  $\lambda_j^*$ , is zero.
- ▶ Constraints that are binding and not irrelevant (i.e. the optimizer *would* change if the constraint were removed) have a strictly positive Lagrange multiplier:  $\lambda_j^* > 0$ .
- ▶ For such a constraint, the condition  $g^j(\mathbf{x}^*) = 0$  holds with equality.
- ▶ For constraints that are nonbinding or irrelevant, the constraint may hold without equality.
- ▶ The above conditions are a compact way of writing this down.

- ▶ Consider the following maximization problem with two constraints:

$$\max_x -x^2 \quad \text{s.t.} \quad -1 \leq x \leq 1$$

- ▶ We can rewrite the constraints as:  
 $g^1(x) = -x - 1 \leq 0, g^2(x) = x - 1 \leq 0.$
- ▶ Clearly, the maximizer is  $x^* = 0$ , and both constraints are non-binding.
- ▶ Therefore, the Lagrange multipliers for both constraints are zero:  
 $\lambda_1^* = \lambda_2^* = 0.$
- ▶ Both constraints are satisfied with strict inequality.
- ▶ The first-order conditions for the Lagrangian simply reduce to  $f'(x^*) = 0$ , since both Lagrange multipliers are zero.

- ▶ Now, suppose we change the problem so that one constraint becomes binding:

$$\max_x -x^2 \quad \text{s.t. } 1 \leq x \leq 2$$

- ▶ We can rewrite the constraints as:  
 $g^1(x) = -x + 1 \leq 0, g^2(x) = x - 2 \leq 0.$
- ▶ Since  $-x^2$  is decreasing as  $x > 0$ , the maximizer is where the first constraint becomes binding, so  $x^* = 1.$
- ▶ The Lagrange multiplier for the first, binding constraint is positive:  
 $\lambda_1^* > 0.$
- ▶ The Lagrange multiplier for the second, non-binding constraint is zero:  $\lambda_2^* = 0.$
- ▶ Only the second constraint is satisfied with strict inequality.
- ▶ The Lagrangian becomes:  $L(x, \lambda_1, \lambda_2) = -x^2 - \lambda_1(-x + 1).$
- ▶ When finding the solution, we treat the binding constraint as an equality, and ignore the non-binding constraint.

- ▶ The KKT conditions don't tell us which constraints will be binding or not. We have to use additional information.
- ▶ For example, in consumer theory, we will frequently have a constrained maximization problem with two goods,  $x_1$  and  $x_2$ , and three constraints:
  - ▶  $x_1 \geq 0$
  - ▶  $x_2 \geq 0$
  - ▶ a budget constraint:  $p_1x_1 + p_2x_2 \leq y$ .
- ▶ If we had no additional information, then the solution might be in the interior (all constraints nonbinding), or at one of the corners (two constraints binding).
- ▶ However, we will typically assume the objective function is strictly increasing. Then the maximum must be on the budget constraint.
- ▶ Furthermore, we may assume the objective function goes to negative infinity at  $x_1 = 0$  or  $x_2 = 0$ . Then the first two constraints will never be binding.
- ▶ Taken together, this tells us that only the budget constraint will be binding, and we can treat it as a problem with a single equality constraint.

# Next Week

- ▶ For next week, please begin reading Chapter 1 of the textbook.
- ▶ We will begin the study of consumer theory.