**List of Papers for Article Review #1**

* Diamond & Dybvig (1983), "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity", Journal of Political Economy 91, 401-419
* Diamond (1984), "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring", Review of Economic Studies 51, 393-414
* Stiglitz & Weiss (1981), "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information", American Economic Review 71, 393-410
* Boyd & Prescott (1986), "Financial Intermediary Coalitions", Journal of Economic Theory 38, 211-232
* Holmstrom & Tirole (1998), "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity", Journal of Political Economy 106 1-40
* Holmstrom, B., & Tirole, J. (1997). “Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real sector”, Quarterly Journal of economics, 112(3), 663-691.
* Diamond & Rajan (2001), "Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking", Journal of Political Economy 94 691-719
* Gale & Hellwig (1985), "Incentive Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem", Review of Economic Studies, 52, 647-663
* Rajan, R. (1992), “Insiders and Outsiders: the Choice Between Relationship and Arms Length Debt”, Journal of Finance, 47:1367-1400.
* Petersen, M., and R. Rajan. 1995. “The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 407–443.
* Manove, M., J. Padilla and M. Pagano (1999), “Collateral versus Project Screening: a Model of Lazy Banks”, Rand Journal of Economics 32:726-744
* Kaplan, Steven N., and Per Strömberg. "Financial contracting theory meets the real world: An empirical analysis of venture capital contracts." Review of Economic Studies 70.2 (2003): 281-315.
* Sharpe, S., "Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships", Journal of Finance, 1990; vol. 45; 4: 1069-87.
* Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale: “Competition and financial stability”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 2004, 36:3, 453-480