CUR 412: Game Theory and its Applications, Lecture 8

Prof. Ronaldo CARPIO

April 26, 2016

Prof. Ronaldo CARPIO CUR 412: Game Theory and its Applications, Lecture 8


3 × 4 3 ×

• HW #3 will be posted later today, due in 2 weeks.

▲圖 ▶ ▲ 国 ▶ ▲ 国 ▶ →

æ


Review of Previous Lecture: Extensive Games



- Extensive games can model a situation where players move sequentially.
- We describe extensive games with a *game tree*.
- Each *node* in the tree corresponds to a player's turn to move.
- Each branch from a node corresponds to an action of the player who moved.

• 3 >

Review of Previous Lecture: Extensive Games




- A *history* is a sequence of actions (i.e. a path from the *root node* to some other node).
- A terminal history is a path from the root node to a leaf node (i.e. an "ending" to the game).
- Players have preferences over terminal histories.

(E) < E)</p>

Strategies in Extensive Form Games

- One approach to solving an extensive form game is to formulate it as a strategic (i.e. simultaneous-move) game, then use the Nash equilibrium solution concept.
- We need to expand the definition of an "strategy".
- Before, a player's strategy only had to specify one action.
- Now, it must specify the player's action at *all* places in the game where that player moves.
- Definition: A strategy of player *i* in an extensive game with perfect information is a function that assigns to each history *h* after which it is *i*'s turn to move, an action in *A*(*h*) (the actions available after *h*).

- 사례가 사용가 사용가 구용




- In this game, Player 1 only moves at the start (i.e. after the empty history Ø). The actions available are C, D, so Player 1 has two strategies: Ø → C, Ø → D.
- Player 2 moves after the history C and also after D. After C, available actions are E, F. After D, available actions are G, H.
- Player 2 has four strategies:

	Action assigned to history C	Action assigned to history D
Strategy 1	E	G
Strategy 2	E	Н
Strategy 3	F	G
Strategy 4	F	Н

▶ In this case, it's simple enough to write them together. We can refer to these strategies as *EG*, *EH*, *FG*, *FH*. The first action corresponds to the first history *C*.


Strategies in Extensive Form Games

- We can think of a strategy as an action plan or contingency plan: If Player 1 chooses action X, do Y.
- However, a strategy must specify an action for *all* histories, even if they do not occur due to previous choices in the strategy.



- In this example, a strategy for Player 1 must specify an action for the history (C, E), even if it specifies D at the beginning.
- Think of this as allowing for the possibility of mistakes in execution.

Strategy Profiles & Outcomes




- As before, a *strategy profile* is a list of the strategies of all players.
- Given a strategy profile s, the terminal history that results by executing the actions specified by s is denoted O(s), the outcome of s.
- For example, in this game, the outcome of the strategy pair (DG, E) is the terminal history D.
- The outcome of (CH, E) is the terminal history (C, E, H).

Definition The strategy profile s* in an extensive game with perfect information is a Nash equilibrium if, for every player i and strategy r_i of player i, the outcome O(s*) is at least as good as the outcome O(r_i, s^{*}_{-i}) generated by any other strategy profile (r_i, s^{*}_{-i}) in which player i chooses r_i:

 $u_i(O(s^*)) \ge u_i(O(r_i, s^*_{-i}))$ for every strategy r_i of player i

We can construct the *strategic form* of an extensive game by listing all strategies of all players and finding the outcome.

Strategic Form of Entry Game




The strategic form of the Entry Game is:

	Incumbent		
	Acquiesce	Fight	
Challenger In	2,1	0,0	
Out Out	1,2	1,2	

- There are two Nash equilibria: (*In*, *Acquiesce*) and (*Out*, *Fight*).
- The first NE is the same as the one found with backwards induction.
- In the second NE, the incumbent chooses Fight. However, if In is taken as given, this is not rational. This is called an *incredible threat*.
- If the incumbent could commit to *Fight* at the beginning of the game, it would be credible.

- The concept of Nash equilibrium ignores the sequential structure of an extensive game.
- It treats strategies as choices made once and for all at the beginning of the game.
- However, the equilibria of this method may contain incredible threats.
- We'll define a notion of equilibrium that excludes incredible situations.
- Suppose Γ is an extensive form game with perfect information.
- The subgame following a non-terminal history h, Γ(h), is the game beginning at the point just after h.
- A proper subgame is a subgame that is not Γ itself.

(日) (日) (日)




This game has two proper subgames:



< ≣⇒

æ

- A subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy profile s* in which each subgame's strategy profile is also a Nash equilibrium.
- Each player's strategy must be optimal for all subgames that have him moving at the beginning, not just the entire game.



 (*Out*, *Fight*) is a NE, but is not a subgame perfect equilibrium because in the subgame following *In*, the strategy *Fight* is not optimal for the incumbent.

向下 イヨト イヨト


- Every subgame perfect equilibrium is also a Nash equilibrium, but not vice versa.
- A subgame perfect equilibrium induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
- In games with finite histories, subgame perfect equilibria are consistent with backwards induction.

向下 イヨト イヨト

Backwards Induction in Finite-Horizon Games

- In a game with a *finite horizon* (i.e. finite maximum length of all terminal histories), we can find all SPNE through backwards induction.
- This procedure can be interpreted as reasoning about how players will behave in future situations.
- Procedure:
 - For all subgames of length 1 (i.e. 1 action away from a terminal node), find the optimal actions of the players.
 - Take these actions as given. For all subgames of length 2, find the optimal actions of the players...
 - Repeat until we cover the entire tree.


・ 回 と ・ ヨ と ・ モ と




There are 2 subgames with length 1.

< ∃⇒

æ



- Consider the left subgame. It is Player 2's turn to move.
- Player 2's optimal action is E, resulting in payoff (2,1).
- We will assume Player 2 always chooses E, so the payoff of this subgame is (2,1).




• Therefore, the payoff to Player 1 choosing C is (2,1).

A ■


-

Example 170.1




- Consider the right subgame. It is Player 2's turn to move.
- Player 2's optimal action is H, resulting in payoff (1,3).
- We will assume Player 2 always chooses H, so the payoff of this subgame is (1,3).

∃ >



- Therefore, the payoff to Player 1 choosing D is (1,3).
- Now, Player 1's optimal action is C.
- Backwards induction gives the strategy pair (*C*, *EH*).
- The outcome of (*C*, *EH*) is the terminal history *CE* with payoff (2,1).


∃ >



• We mark the optimal actions at each node with thick lines.


3

Strategic Form of 170.1




	EG	EΗ	FG	FH
С	2,1	2,1	3,0	3,0
D	0,2	1,3	0,2	1,3

- Let's compare the backwards induction result (C, EH) to the NE of the strategic form.
- (C, EG) and (C, EH) are NE of strategic form.
- However, (C, EG) includes a non-optimal action for Player 2 in the right subgame, so is not a subgame-perfect NE.




• There is one subgame with length 1, and one subgame with length 2.

< ∃⇒




- In this subgame, it is Player 1's turn to move.
- Optimal action is G, resulting in payoff (1,2).

3




- Assume Player 1 chooses G with certainty.
- Then, the payoff to choosing E is (1,2).

-




- In this subgame, it is Player 2's turn to move.
- Optimal action is E, resulting in payoff (1,2).

3




- Optimal action is *D*, resulting in payoff (2,0).
- Backwards induction gives the strategy pair (DG, E) resulting in terminal history D.


 

 Backwards induction gives the strategy pair (DG, E) resulting in terminal history D.

• 3 >

Strategic Form of 160.1






3

- NE of strategic form are: (CH, F), (DG, E), (DH, E).
- Only (DG, E) is a subgame perfect NE.


Example 158.1 (Variant of Entry Game)



- What if there are multiple optimal actions in a subgame? Then we need to keep track of them separately.
- This is a variant of the entry game in which the Incumbent is indifferent between *Acquiesce*, *Fight*.

4 B K 4 B K


Example 158.1 (Variant of Entry Game)



- In this subgame, both Acquiesce and Fight are optimal actions.
- We cannot eliminate either as an irrational choice. So, we keep track of both possibilities.

< 注→ < 注→

Example 158.1 (Variant of Entry Game)




- Backwards induction gives (In, Acquiesce) and (Out, Fight).
- In this case, the NE of the strategic form are the same as the subgame-perfect NE.

- E - - E -

- The action set at a node may be infinite (e.g. if the player chooses a real number).
- In this case, we graphically represent this with an arc between the lowest and highest possible values.
- Effectively, there are an *infinite* number of branches in the game tree at this node.
- Suppose it is Player *i*'s turn to move after all of these branches. Then Player *i*'s strategy profile must specify an action for *all* possible branches.

・ 回 と ・ ヨ と ・ モ と


Continuous Action Sets



- If the infinite set of actions is an interval of real numbers [a, b], then Player i's strategy profile for this node must be a *function* over [a, b].
- For a strategy profile to be a subgame perfect NE, it must induce a NE at each of the infinite subgames.

- A union and a firm are bargaining.
- First, the union presents a wage demand $w \ge 0$.
- The firm chooses an amount $L \ge 0$ of labor to hire.
- The firm's output is L(100 L) when it uses $L \le 50$ units of labor, and 2500 if L > 50.
- The price of output is 1.
- The firm's preferences are represented by its profits.
- > The union's preferences are represented by the total wage bill, wL.

・ 同 ト ・ ヨ ト ・ ヨ ト



The firm's payoff is its profit, given by:

$$\Pi(w, L) = \begin{cases} L(100 - L) - wL & \text{if } L \le 50\\ 2500 - wL & \text{if } L > 50 \end{cases}$$

Union's payoff: wL

물 제 문 제 문 제

$$\Pi(w, L) = \begin{cases} L(100 - L) - wL & \text{if } L \le 50\\ 2500 - wL & \text{if } L > 50 \end{cases}$$

- For every w ≥ 0, there is a subgame where the firm's payoff depends on w.
- ▶ Profit has a quadratic part (if $L \le 50$) and a linear part (if L > 50), and is continuous at L = 50.
- We want to find the profit-maximizing choice of *L*.
- The linear part is decreasing in L, so we can ignore it (its maximum is at L = 50).
- Quadratic part is maximized at $L^* = \frac{100-w}{2}$.

- Quadratic part is maximized at $L^* = \frac{100-w}{2}$.
- Firm's profit is:

$$\frac{100-w}{2}(100-\frac{100-w}{2})-w\frac{100-w}{2}=\frac{(w-100)^2}{4}$$

 Profit is always non-negative. Firm's best response correspondence is:

$$B_f(w) = \begin{cases} L \ge 50 & \text{if } w = 0\\ L = \frac{100 - w}{2} & \text{if } 0 < w \le 100\\ L = 0 & \text{if } w > 100 \end{cases}$$

・ 同 ト ・ ヨ ト ・ ヨ ト

$$B_f(w) = \begin{cases} L \ge 50 & \text{if } w = 0\\ L = \frac{100 - w}{2} & \text{if } 0 < w \le 100\\ L = 0 & \text{if } w > 100 \end{cases}$$

- Now, consider the union's decision.
- If w = 0 or w > 100, union's payoff is 0.
- $wB_f(w) = \frac{w(100-w)}{2}$ is maximized at $w^* = 50$.
- $L^* = B_f(50) = 25.$

伺 と く き と く き と

- The set of subgame perfect NE is:
- Union's strategy profile: at the empty history, choose w = 50.
- Firm's strategy profile: at the subgame following the history w, choose an element of $B_f(w)$.
- Note that the firm has an infinite number of strategy profiles, but there is only one equilibrium outcome, since only the subgame after w = 50 will be realized.
- Firm's payoff is 625 and union's payoff is 1250.

・ 同 ト ・ ヨ ト ・ ヨ ト

- Is there an outcome that both players prefer to the SPNE outcome with payoffs (1250, 625)?
- Suppose that instead of each player maximizing his own payoff, a social planner could choose both w and L.
- ► The sum of payoffs is L(100 L) wL + wL = L(100 L) which is maximized at L = 50. The choice of w then allocates payoffs to the firm and union.
- For example, if w = 30, then the firm's payoff is 1000 and the union's payoff is 1500.
- This is an illustration that individual maximization may not achieve the most efficient outcome.

(4回) (注) (注) (注) (注)

- Is there a Nash equilibrium outcome that differs from any subgame perfect NE outcome?
- Suppose the union's strategy is: offer w = 100 and the firm's strategy profile is: for any w, offer L = 0.
- The firm has no incentive to deviate, since it will make a negative payoff for any L > 0.
- The union has no incentive to deviate, because it will get a payoff of 0 for any choice of w.
- This is not subgame perfect, since the firm's strategy is not optimal for w < 100.

・ 同 ト ・ ヨ ト ・ ヨ ト

- Proposition: In a finite horizon extensive game with perfect information, the set of strategy profiles isolated by backwards induction is the set of all subgame-perfect equilibria.
- **Proposition**: Every finite extensive game with perfect information has a subgame perfect equilibrium.

向下 イヨト イヨト

- Please read Chapter 5.
- Also, HW #3 will be posted later today, due in 2 weeks.

(4回) (4回) (日)

3